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The War on Terrorism as State of Exception: A Challenge for Transnational 
Gender Theory 
 
By Sarah Blake 
 
Abstract  
In this article, I explore the contributions of theoretical engagements of bare life 
and states of exception to gender theory in relation to the U.S.-led ‘war on terrorism,’ 
beginning in 2001. I discuss connections between the ongoing struggle over 
representations of the ‘Third World Woman,’ among feminists and the mainstream 
discourse that established the United States’ invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and 
imprisonment of an extralegal class of ‘detainees’ as an inevitable, natural consequence 
of exceptional difference. In addition I highlight the responsibility academics, including 
feminist academics, to consider their own positions in relation to the economic, political 
and representational power dynamics they analyze. 
 
Keywords: United States, war on terrorism, state of exception, transnational feminism, 
politics of representation, ethics 
 
Introduction: 
Theoretical engagements of ‘States of exception’ and ‘bare life’ are, as a rule, 
critiques of power.  Like gender theory, this realm of critical engagement focuses on the 
consequences of politics and state power on the body.
1
 Where gender theory has long 
prioritized the body and the experience of power as a basis for its critiques,
2
 theories of 
bare life and the state of exception address violence perpetrated on the body in the  
exercise of extra-legal power.
3
 Most significantly, the connections between, and potential 
contributions of one to the other, revolve around questions of what is at stake in 
analyzing a particular experience of power in a particular way. The focused, ethical 
urgency of theoretical engagements of states of exception has much to offer gender 
theory. Put simply, it illuminates the stakes of issues that are already under consideration 
by gender scholars. The struggle over representations of the ‘Muslim Woman’ in 
American popular discourse in the early 2000’s is instructive. In this essay, I will discuss 
how specific works in both theoretical traditions deconstruct the idea that the United 
States’ response to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was natural, inevitable and 
justified. The ‘war on terrorism,’ was justified by the claim of an intractable, culturally 
                                                 
1
 Biopower, or discipline and regulation of the body as a means of state power, See: Michel Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) 139-
140.  
2
 A summary of this can be found in Catherine Bell’s mapping of body-centered scholarly traditions: 
“feminist scholarship has pioneered the recognition of gender as a fundamental condition of experience and 
as an analytic category for specifically addressing the body’s relation to language and identity, writing and 
power”  Catherine Bell, “The Ritual Body,” (Ch. 5 in Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 96.  
3
 For a discussion of Agamben’s theory of bare life as pushing “Foucauldian thought into dark spaces” or 
biopolitics as control of bodies denied political existence See Christine Sylvester, “Bare Life as a 
Development/Postcolonial Problematic,” “Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic” (The 
Geographical Journal, 172 (1) [2006]: 66-77), 67. 
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inscribed opposition of cultures.  The challenges to this claim that I will explore here 
carry ethical questions for academics, and raise new possibilities for critiques of state 
power and violence. 
Questions regarding the historical and discursive constructions of what constitutes 
natural or inevitable power dynamics, the role of the academic in the world and the 
interpretation of personal experience of political institutions are priorities for theorists 
working in both fields of bare life and gender theory. Beginning from these shared 
questions, it becomes evident that theories of the state of exception and gender theory 
have much to offer each other. A conversation between them can illuminate historical, 
social, cultural and legal contexts for particular, pressing ethical demands. 
The focus of recent theoretical engagements on the ways that states of exception 
are constructed and preserved resonates with gender theory’s ongoing struggle with 
political and social exercise of power internationally. With the centrality of the image of 
the ‘Muslim Woman’ in arguments for the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and in the 
years since, gender theorists, including Lila Abu-Lughod and Judith Butler, have  -  
explicitly or implicitly - engaged with the multiple  ways that states of exception are 
constructed and justified. From the lead-up to the invasion of Afghanistan through the 
spectacle of the abuses at Abu Ghraib and continuing today, as a new administration 
struggles with the “war on terrorism ,” (in both discourse and policy), the multiple 
‘fronts’ in what has become an increasingly nebulous, global conflict, have been 
understood in gendered, sexualized terms. Giorgio Agamben contends, “the essential task 
of a theory of the state of exception is not simply to clarify whether it has juridical nature 
or not, but to define the meaning, place, and modes of its relation to the law.”
4
  He finds 
the state of exception pervading institutions beyond new detention centers or legal 
procedures.  Here, the investment that many feminist scholars share in discourse and 
representation – in politics, media, and academia can find an ally in engagements of the 
state of exception. 
The dominant discourse used by the United States’ government under the Bush 
administration treated the ‘war’ as exceptional at every level: a new kind of war, with a 
global reach and exceptional urgency, requiring exceptional exercises of power, and the 
suspension of normal legal processes. When it comes to concrete interactions, both the 
United States government and the detainees are treated as exceptional, involving neither a 
normal armed conflict or criminal endeavor, but a grand struggle between good and evil. 
This exception, in the form of claims that normal law does not apply, is a subject that 
demands investigation both in relation explicit theoretical engagements of bare life and 
the state of exception and in relation to  gender theory, as it was established in explicitly 
gendered terms. 
To discuss the gender dimensions of the ‘war on terrorism,’ and the institutions it 
has established, it is important to first discuss what constitutes a state of exception in any 
context. Giorgio Agamben provides a definition: “The state of exception is not a special 
kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical 
order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.”
5
 He further asserts: “In any case, 
to understand the problem of the state of exception, one must first correctly determine its 
localization (or illocalization) . . . the conflict over the state of exception presents itself 
                                                 
4
 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 51. 
 
5
 Agamben, State of Exception, 4. 
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essentially as a dispute over its proper locus.”
6
   The primary institution of the state of 
exception is  ‘the camp,’ which is located in a ‘juridico-political structure.’
7
 The state of 
exception  in this conflict is located in the  physical institutions of military prisons 
outside of normal U.S. territory, and the broader context of public culture, and political 
discourse. .. It is in the focus on this structure, and, particularly, the political elements, 
that this resonates with the strand of gender theory dedicated to interrogating the 
justification for construction of oppressive biopolitics,
8
 particularly in transnational 
exercises of power.  
To heed Christine Sylvester’s call to “follow bare life politics into its hideouts, 
and into our texts and toolboxes as well, searching with undeflecting and nuancing 
eyes”
9
 demands applying a gendered lens to the context that has allowed for the 
production of a state of exception. Sylvester points to a particular responsibility in her 
call to search out the ‘bare life politics’ that may be hiding out in gender theory. This 
requires locating the dynamics that, extending beyond government offices, allow states of 
exception to take hold in societies where sovereign power is normally assumed to be 
constrained by the law requires more than a dispassionate examination from without.
10
 
Sylvester echoes a call that resonates with those of postcolonial feminist theorists like 
Gayatri Spivak and Chandra Mohanty, who contend that feminist academics have no 
choice but to examine their own position, and the consequences of their own attempts at 
representing themselves and others.
11
 To take the history of epistemic violence seriously 
means to pay attention to “remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to 
constitute the colonial subject as Other,”
12
 and to expose such projects wherever they 
arise.  
While searching out the hideouts of bare life politics, however, it is also important 
to map the state of exception’s most obvious supporting elements. Here, this involves 
theoretical engagements that maps the more overt arguments supporting a state of 
exception in U.S. military prisons and the conduct of the ‘war on terrorism’ in general.  
For this, I will turn to the discussion of terrorism and security that Judith Butler discussed 
in Precarious Life, published in 2004. In Butler’s assessment, the United States 
responded to the unprecedented experience of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 
with “heightened nationalist discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended 
constitutional rights, and developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship.
13
” Butler 
argues against any claim that these developments were natural or inevitable. She focuses 
on an effort that extends beyond the ‘military order’ allowing for ‘indefinite detention’ 
                                                 
6
  Ibid., 24. 
7
 Giorgio Agamben, “The Camp as the Nomos of the Modern” (Ch. 7 in Homo Sacer: Sovereignty and 
Bare Life, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), 170. 
8
 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 139.  
9
 Sylvester, “Bare life as a development/postcolonial problematic,” 75. 
10
 See Butler, Precarious Life and Agamben “The Camp as the Nomos” and State of Exception for further 
discussions of the forms of state power.    
11
 See Chandra Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses” (Ch. 1 in 
Chandra Mohanty, Ed. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. Durham: 
Duke University Press: 2003, 17-42), and Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Chapter 4 in P. 
Williams, and L. Chrisman, Eds. Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994: 66-111). 
12
 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76. 
13
 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2003),  xi. 
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and trial by non-juridical ‘military commissions’ that Agamben cites as the genesis of a 
persistent state of exception
14
. Butler, too, understands the consequences of this 
suspension of normal law, and focuses her analysis on the elements that contributed to its 
appearance as utterly necessary, if not natural.  
By highlighting the silencing of serious explorations of why the attacks occurred 
within the United States, followed by a starkly differing treatment of American lives and 
Afghan ones lost in the wake of the United States’ military response, Butler illuminates a 
broader ‘state of exception’ permeating American public life in the early 2000’s. Butler 
asserts this issue of grievability as fundamental to the state of exception: “the differential 
allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and 
which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary 
conceptions of who is normatively human.”
15
 Here, the exception is located in literal 
space at Guantanamo Bay, where “the dehumanization effected by ‘indefinite detention’ 
makes use of an ethnic frame for conceiving who will be human, and who will not.”
16
 
Observing the fallout, both in the erasure of combat-related deaths and the treatment of 
‘detainees,’
17
 Butler touches on an underlying contemporary political current and a 
crucial link to historical exercises of domination linked to the history of conquest and 
colonization. She points out that “the dehumanization that Orientalism already performs 
is heightened to an extreme, so that the uniqueness and exceptionalism of this kind of war 
makes it exempt from the presumptions and protections of universality and 
civilization.”
18
 Butler both demands attention to historical context and highlights a 
historical context which, ironically, involves a long history of claims to ‘unique,’ 
unprecedented need to suspend normal law based on a suspension of the recognition of 
the ‘Other’s’ common humanity. 
The paradox of the exception claimed here sits with the fact that the United States 
claimed that part of its mission was in defending the rights of women, which it inevitably 
couched in universalizing, civilizational terms. This particular paradox lends itself to a 
dimension of what a state of exception requires, “this space devoid of law seems, for 
some reason, to be so essential to the juridical order that it must seek in every way to 
assure itself a relation with it,”
19
 including this international juridical order of gender 
equality.  In her 2002 essay, ‘Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?’ Lila Abu-
Lughod addresses the deployment of images of women in the discursive war effort. She 
focuses on the ethical questions raised by the “’war on terrorism,’ a war which justifies 
itself by purporting to liberate, or save, Afghan women.”
20
 The questions she poses and 
discomfort she expresses occupy the point where gender theory’s position in relation to 
                                                 
14
 Agamben pinpoints the nexus of the state of exception in a November 13, 2001 executive order 
permitting noncitizen terrorism suspects to be held indefinitely and, if tried, to be subject only to trial by 
military commissions, which, he stresses, are not governed by the “law of war” that applies to military 
tribunals that often decide the fates of combatants during normal conflicts. Agamben, State of Exception, 3. 
15
 Butler, Precarious Life, xiv-xv. 
16
 Butler, Precarious Life,  xvi. 
17
 “The prisoners . . . are not even called ‘prisoners’ by the Department of Defense or by representatives of 
the current US administration. To call them by that name would suggest that internationally recognized 
rights pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war ought to come into play.” Ibid., 64. 
18
 Ibid., 89 
19
 Agamben, State of Exception, 51. 
20
 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural 
Relativism and Its Others” (American Anthropologist 104 (3) [2002]: 783-790), 783. 
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the state of exception is most relevant. That is, the point where a gendered discourse is 
used to justify the construction of a state of exception.  Abu-Lughod’s concerns are 
hardly new, even if the events inspiring them are. Indeed, Gayatri Spivak highlighted the 
same issue when she declared, many years earlier (and referring to earlier events), “what 
interests me is that the protection of women (today the ‘Third World Woman’) becomes a 
signifier for the establishment of a good society which must, at some inaugurative 
moments, transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy.”
21
 That is, where women’s 
status in one society is treated as evidence of that society’s backwardness, and 
justification for any intervention on the part of a self-professed guardian of gender 
equality becomes an urgent case of “white men saving brown women from brown men.”
22
  
Like Butler, Abu-Lughod’s ethical queries carry an awareness of historical context, and, 
particularly, the cultural and social dimensions of the justifications for establishing 
exceptional legal – or extralegal – procedures and physical spaces. 
Abu-Lughod’s discomfort with the public discourse on gender and, crucially, 
‘culture,’ raises important questions for both academics and activists, which lend urgency 
and specificity to questions that have concerned Spivak and other gender theorists for 
decades. Considering the degree to which gender theorists have, as a community, 
struggled to deal with ‘culture,’ her criticism of the popular discourse around the invasion 
of Afghanistan retains a particular salience: 
 
The question is why knowing about the ‘culture’ of the region, and 
particularly its religious beliefs and treatment of women, was more urgent 
than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the 
region and the U.S.’s role in this history. Such cultural framing, it seemed 
to me, prevented the serious exploration of the roots and nature of human 
suffering in this part of the world. Instead of political and historical 
explanations, experts were being asked to give religio-cultural ones. 
Instead of questions that might lead to the exploration of global 
interconnections, we were offered ones that work to artificially divide the 
world into separate spheres—recreating an imaginative geography of West 
versus East, us versus Muslims, cultures in which First Ladies give 




The ‘imaginary geography’ that Abu-Lughod describes here is familiar to gender 
theorists working on transnational issues, which relate to how power is justified and 
exercised through actual and imagined space.  Achille Mbembe further explores the 
circular logic of imaginary and physical geography that traps individual bodies in its 
exception in his discussion of the circumstances of colonial occupation. Mbembe asserts: 
 
Colonial occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting and asserting 
control over a physical geographical area—of writing on the grounds a 
new set of social and spatial relations. The writing of new spatial relations 
(territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount of the production of 
                                                 
21
 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 94. 
22
 Ibid., 84. 
23
 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 784. 
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boundaries and hierarchies; zones and enclaves . . . and, finally, the 




Abu-Lughod maps the imaginary geography deployed in discourses about Afghan 
women in a way that reveals their historical precedence in the uses of ‘colonial 
feminism,’
25
 by the English and French in the Middle East in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries. The contrast that she highlights between that administration’s use of images of 
women’s rights in the territories it sought to dominate and the low status it granted to 
women at home
26
 points to a precedent for challenging the American government’s moral 
authority in this case. This rings particularly true in hindsight, and knowledge of the 
United States military’s abuses at Abu Ghraib, which Judith Butler called “the actions of 
a misogynist institution against a population in which women are cast in roles bound by 




Abu-Lughod’s final criticism already touches on some of the instrumentalization 
already at work in 2002: 
 
Even RAWA, the now celebrated Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan, which was so instrumental in bringing to U.S. 
women’s attention to the excesses of the Taliban, has opposed the U.S. 
bombing from the beginning. .  . They consistently remind audiences to 
take a close look at the ways policies are being organized around oil 
interests, the arms industry, and the international drug trade. They are not 
obsessed with the veil, even though they are the most radical feminists 




This creates a sense that, from the beginning, the gender justice argument was almost 
entirely a symbolic one.  This divergence in stated priorities – between the oppressed, yet 
activist RAWA, and the liberating government, raises questions about the degree to 
which Muslim–particularly Afghan—women were and are seen as muted subalterns. 
Indeed, their subaltern status is assured by the fact that even when they actively 
campaigning for their own political priorities, their alleged liberators continue to speak 
for them. Indeed, the treatment of RAWA provides an illustration of Spivak’s argument 
that subalterneity, rather than defined as mere disenfranchisement or disadvantage, but a 
reduction to an identity defined only as difference.
29
 To return to a crucial element of 
Agamben’s idea of what structures states of exception:  
 
…in the modern era, misery and exclusion are not only economic or social 
concepts, but eminently political categories.  . . In this sense, our age is nothing 
                                                 
24
 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Libby Meintjes, trans. (Public Culture 15 (1) [2003]: 11-40), 26. 
25
 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992),  244.  
26
 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 784. 
27
 Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture and Secular Time,” 17. 
28
 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 789 
29
 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 80.  
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but the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the 




It is possible, then, to read the instrumentalization of particular Afghan women’s 
advocacy as a consequence of the American public’s desire to accept any intervention 
that would eliminate this marked difference. This complicates the discussion of the a 
politics that encourage the use of the ‘liberation of Afghan women’ to justify violence 
that inevitably leads to the suffering of many such Afghan women. If symbolic 
deployments of women’s images is shorthand for the existence of the ‘people’ that 
suffers and  that must be eliminated through ‘development’ in some cases, and overt 
violence in others, then investigating the discursive construction of certain categories of 
women becomes an even more urgent task.  
If Muslim women and their clothing will always be trotted out to illustrate the 
utter incommensurability of the East and West, the other strain of Abu-Lughod’s essay, 
which calls on academics and feminists engaged in critiquing the purportedly natural 
institutional power around gender to look more closely at their own positions. . Christine 
Sylvester echoes Abu Lughod’s concerns where she calls for academics and development 
workers to “look at ourselves looking at and aiding others”
31
 in light of the ways in 
which, as institutions, international development organizations and, more importantly, the 
Academy, are treated as separate from the political conditions that   reinforce natural-
seeming divisions and structures of domination. Indeed, this is a particularly important 
point of cohesion for theorists working on understanding states of exception and feminist 
academics, driven by arguments following Mohanty’s:  
 
Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and 
examining its role in such a global economic and political framework. To do any 
less would be to ignore the complex interconnections between First and Third 





Abu-Lughod’s reminder that “We do not stand outside the world, looking out 
over this sea of poor benighted people, living under the shadow—or veil—of oppressive 
cultures; we are part of that world. Islamic movements themselves have arisen in a world 
shaped by the intense engagements of Western powers in Middle Eastern lives”
33
 
challenges the constructed division of (Middle) East and West that claims to necessitate 
an exceptional response. The challenge that Abu-Lughod poses for her audience, and 
particularly the part of her audience that also uses gender lens as both political and 
academic tool echoes both Sylvester
34
 and Spivak, who declares: “The subaltern cannot 
speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with ‘woman’ as a pious item. 
Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a 
                                                 
30
 Agamben, “The Camp as the Nomos,” 179. 
31
 Sylvester, “Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic,” 72. 
32
 Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes,” 20. 
33
 Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” 789. 
34
 Sylvester, “Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic,” 75. 
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circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish.”
35
 Gender theory to join 
postcolonial studies and development studies must, then, involve a degree of self-critique 
and take responsibility to “address more of the troubling biopolitics of our time.”
36
 
Butler’s recent work on sexual politics provides a vivid illustration of the use of 
academic work to  to inform the construction of state of exception. Butler argues that 
‘Bad anthropology’ in the form of a book titled The Arab Mind was used in making up 
procedures meant to intimidate, humiliate and control  detainees:. “Since of course there 
is no ‘Arab mind,’ and it is not possible to attribute the same fears and anxieties across 
the Arab world to its geographical complexity and its cosmopolitan formulation, the text 
constructed an object that it could manipulate.”
37
 In addition to highlighting the ethical 
responsibilities of the academic, Butler extends the critiques of the state of exception, to 
reveal its reliance on an idea of a specific, simplistic form of cultural difference 
reinforced by an academic text.   
In considering the ways in which American politics have taken an exceptional 
form in the last few years, it is striking to read, repeatedly, the overt demands for a new 
configuration of politics from theorists discussing states of exception.  While Agamben’s 
theory of the state of exception is neither a perfect description of the world, nor a solution 
to all of the difficulties within gender theory, or in the relationships gender theory has 
with other critical fields, it provides useful dimensions for exploring gender-based 
inquiries into exercises of power within and beyond the law. 
 In their discussions of different elements of the discourse and conduct of the ‘war 
on terrorism,’ Judith Butler and Lila Abu-Lughod have highlighted many of the historical 
precedents and contextual influences for this particular conflict and the institutions it 
depends on to continue.  Their arguments underscore the responsibility gender theorists 
hold for engaging with the distribution of power that allows this to persist. This 
responsibility extends begins with the task of investigating and, where appropriate, 
challenging claims that women can be liberated by a foreign government’s invasion of 
their country.   
Whether the conduct of this conflict consists a point at which a truly new politics, 
heeding Agamben’s claim that “only a politics that will have learned to take the 
fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop this 
oscillation and to put an end to the civil war that divides the people and the cities of the 
earth,” 
38
 or Butler’s lamentation of the lost opportunity to introduce a nonviolent ethics 
American politics based in the awareness of its own vulnerability
39
 remains to be seen. 
However, the possibility that theorizations of states of exception offers to disciplines that 
already function as critiques of biopower is one of altering, or expanding the basis for 
critique. Perhaps, through the reflection of engagements of states of exception and gender 
it will be possible to follow Butler’s argument  “only . . .  a critique of state violence” 
will allow for “finding and acknowledging the already existing alliances and sites of 
contact . . .  in order to consider systematically how coercion seeks to divide us and to 
                                                 
35
 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”104. 
36
 Sylvester, “Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic,” 76. 
37
 Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture and Secular Time,” 15. 
38
 Agamben, “The Camp as the Nomos,” 180. 
39
 Butler, Precarious Life, xi-xii. 
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keep attention deflected from the critique of violence itself,”
40
 and, from there, to 




                                                 
40
 Butler, “Sexual politics, Torture and Secular Time,” 21.  
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